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The taxpayer's tale
by Professor Peter Willoughby
Professor Peter Willoughby examines the issues which arose in his 
appeal against assessments made by the UK Inland Revenue and the 
impact of this case on expatriates' retirement arrangements and wider 
policy issues.
The Willouahbj- case began with a letter from the taxpayers to the Special Investigation Section of the UK Inland Revenue in March 1991. This letter explained the
background to investment savings held in three personal o o
portfolio bonds which were part of a long-term retirement 
savings plan which began in 1979. The litigation did not end 
until the decision of the House of Lords was announced on 10 
July 1997. It was thought that the matter was not yet entirely 
closed because the taxpayer had made a number of complaints 
to the Adjudicator, Elizabeth Filkin, and her report was expected 
later in 1998. However, the Inland Revenue has agreed to repay 
tax to all the aggrieved bond holders and therefore much of what 
was needed to be achieved for bond holders who used bonds as 
a genuine alternative (and ultimately taxable) pension 
arrangement, has been achieved. The taxpayer has withdrawn his 
complaints and the Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue 
has apologised in most gracious terms. Since then the Inland 
Revenue has published a press release, No. 38 (17 March 1998), 
following the 1998 budget speech in which personal portfolio 
bonds are referred to as 'designed primarily for tax avoidance 
purposes'. This is difficult to reconcile with the unanimous 
decision of the House of Lords and the Chairman's letter of 
apology. The Budget itself contained some penal and 
retrospective proposals which, if implemented without bond 
holders being given a chance to convert their bonds to theo o
managed type, will have monstrously unfair consequences and 
may result in an application to have the legislation declared 
contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights. A 
possible wray forward is indicated at the end of this article.
BIAS
Litigants who comment on their own litigation inevitably do so 
subjectively. While every attempt will be made to be objective, readers 
should make allowances for the author's subjectivity.
Following the decisions of the special commissioner in March 
1993, the Court of Appeal in December 1994 and the House of 
Lords in July 1997, there have been a large number of articles 
written about various aspects of the case. Very few of these have 
attempted to cover all the legal issues raised. Several recent 
articles following the decision of the House of Lords have failed 
to state the facts correctly (two invented new 'facts'), failed to 
state the law correctly and failed to emphasise the most 
important part of the House of Lords decision which concerned 
the meaning of tax avoidance. It should be added that, as has not
been made clear in many articles, those who have used private 
portfolio bonds (or managed portfolio bonds) as part of wider 
tax planning schemes, such as putting them into trust to avoid 
inheritance tax and income tax after the death of the bond 
holder settlor in reliance upon the so-called dead settlor 
loophole in s. 547 Income and Corporations Taxes Act 1998 ('The 
Taxes Act'), are not covered by the decision in the House of 
Lords in the Willoughby case and may not be able to rely on the 
s. 741 escape clauses should the Inland Revenue decide to apply 
s. 739 in their cases to post 26 November 1996 bond income. 
The 1998 Budget proposals include a provision to cancel the tax 
advantage of putting bonds into trust. Although this was, in the 
writer's view unnecessary, this proposal cancels a provocative tax 
planning scheme which cannot reasonably have been within the 
intention of Parliament when the 1984 chargeable events regime 
was enacted.
This article attempts to put the record straight on the facts, 
the law and the public policy issues. It is divided into three parts. 
First, the facts are summarised, secondly the legal issues are 
explained and, thirdly, public policy considerations are 
considered in outline. It should be said that this case is not 
merely a tax case; it has exposed serious shortcomings in the 
operational procedures of the Inland Revenue, lack of sound 
judgment on the part of the Board of Inland Revenue in 
pursuing a very weak case and flagrant disregard of the intention 
of both Parliament and the Board of Inland Revenue itself when 
the legislation was first enacted in 1936. As a consequence many 
individuals have been wrongly assessed as to income tax, an issue 
conceded by the Inland Revenue in a press release issued on 18 
December 1997. Since then the Inland Revenue has ignored the 
unanimous decision of the House of Lords that the use of 
personal portfolio bonds as part of a long-term retirement 
arrangement is not tax avoidance and announced savage 
legislation to render personal portfolio bonds wholly 
impracticable. This is disturbing, particularly as the House of 
Lords referred to the Inland Revenue's argument that their use 
was tax avoidance, as 'absurd'.
THE FACTS
The taxpayers, Professor and Mrs Willoughby, have spent the 
greater part of their working lives in developing countries in 
non-pensionable employment. In 1979 the taxpayers became 
aware of qualifying 104- policies (a specialised life policy 
designed for savings with tax benefit entitlements) and life 
insurance bonds which provided a means of saving for 
retirement which, for an expatriate, could achieve some of the
advantages of retirement annuities or personal pensions which 
are only available to UK residents.
In November 1983 the Inland Revenue issued a press release 
which explained how offshore life insurance bonds would be 
taxed under legislation which was enacted in the Finance Act 1984 
(see sch. IS). In July 1986 Professor Willoughby retired from his 
post as Professor of Law with the University of Hong Kong and 
received a lump sum provident fund payment from a Hong Kong 
Inland Revenue-approved retirement scheme. Acting on advice, 
this was invested in a series of life insurance bonds with Royal 
Life International of the Isle of Man in the taxpayers' joint 
names. The intention was that the taxpayers would be liable to 
income tax on all gains made within the bond at maturity' after
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twenty years or on earlier withdrawals which exceeded 5% per 
annum of the initial premium. If it had been possible to place 
the lump sum in a UK-based tax exempt retirement fund to 
which the taxpayers could have contributed from their 'relevant 
income' on returning to work in the UK, which at retirement 
produced a taxable pension, they would have done so.
In 1989 and 1990 three qualifying 10+ policies matured to 
produce tax exempt funds. The taxpayers had an option to 
extend the policy for a further ten years with the same tax 
exempt benefits at maturity. Again acting on advice, the 
taxpayers did not exercise their option but transferred the 
underlying investments from the 10+ policies into further life 
insurance bonds with Royal Life. The reasons for doing this were 
to obtain greater investment flexibility, administrative 
convenience and lower charges when investments were changed.o o
In investing in a total of three personal portfolio life insurance 
bonds, the taxpayers relied on the Inland Revenue press release 
of November 1983 and the 1984 tax regime which provided for 
the taxing of bonds on gains when realised (see s. 553, Taxes Act 
1988). The 1984 regime ensured that all gains would eventually 
be taxed in full at higher rates if appropriate.
Sometime in 1990 the taxpayers became aware that the Inland 
Revenue was planning to attack insurance bonds as tax- 
avoidance schemes. In March 1991, Professor Willoughby wrote 
to the Inland Revenue with a full explanation of the bonds and 
explained that they were intended as a bona fide long-term 
retirement arrangement which would eventually be taxed. A 
clearance was requested but refused in a letter from the Inland 
Revenue sent some three and a half months later.
After a long period of delay, various assessments were made on 
the taxpayers under s. 478 and 739, Taxes Acts 1970 and 1988. 
They appealed against the assessments to the special 
commissioners. The hearing of the appeal was in January 1993 
and lasted almost four days. The taxpayers raised a large number 
of legal issues and a decision was given in their favour in Marcho o
1993. The Inland Revenue appealed to the Court of Appeal 
where they were defeated 3 0 and then to the House of Lords 
where they were defeated 5 0. There was no appeal to the High 
Court which was leapfrogged.
BREACH OF THE CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS?
In correspondence, before the assessments were made, the 
Inland Revenue explained that the taxpayers had 'unwittingly' 
bought into a tax-avoidance scheme a somewhat unusual 
concept! The Inland Revenue supported its argument by 
referring to two unreported and confidential decisions of the 
special commisioners. A request for copies was refused although
a brief summary of what the Inland Revenue thought was 
important was provided. Full details of the facts together with 
the reasoning of the special commisioners were refused. Even on 
the basis of the Inland Revenue's brief summary it was clear that 
the two decisions of the special commisioners were readily 
distinguishable. In passing it is interesting to consider whether, 
by relying on unpublished and confidential material which was 
not available to the taxpayers, the Inland Revenue was in breach 
of art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This 
calls for equality of arms, this is to say both sides must have 
access to the same information. A year or so after the decision 
of the Special Commissioner in the Willoughby case, reports of 
decisions of the special commisioners started to be published. 
What, however, is to become of the numerous decisions prior to 
the date when publication began? Are these now to be published 
or should there be a public shredding to ensure compliance by 
the Inland Revenue with art. 6? It appears that reliance on these 
unpublished decisions could cause serious problems for the 
Inland Revenue if the matter is referred to the European Court 
at some future date. The legislation proposed in the 1998 
Finance Capital Bill in relation to personal portfolio bonds is 
retrospective, discriminatory and penal. This, unless it is 
changed, will probably result in an application to the European 
Court of Human Rights.
THE LEGAL ISSUES
The legal issues raised by the taxpayers were as follows:
(1) Does the anti-avoidance s. 739, Taxes Act 1988 (previously 
s. 478 of the Taxes Act 1970) apply to a transfer of assets to a 
non-resident by a non-resident?
(2) Are the courts entitled to refer to the intention of Parliament 
at the time when the legislation was first enacted?
(3) Does s. 739 apply only to UK assets which are transferred 
abroad but not to foreign assets which have never been 
brought into the UK?
(4) Does s. 739 apply to income arising within an insurance 
bond which is subject to a specific code of tax relieving rules 
(s. 539-554)?
(5) Does an assessment under s. 739 result in double taxation 
when gains are assessed under the special regime enacted in 
1984 (s. 539-554)?
(6) Does the deferment of liability constitute avoidance of 
liability for the purposes of s. 739?
(7) What is the meaning of tax-avoidance for the purposes of 
s. 741 (a) and (b) which provide defences to s. 739 
assessments?
(8) Is income which arises in a bond issued by an Isle of Man 
insurance company exempt by virtue of the Isle of Man 
double taxation treaty with the UK?
These eight legal issues will now be considered in more detail,o o '
together with the question of the relevance of the taxpayers 
becoming non-resident again.o o
The first issue: transfers between non-residents
The legislation which has become s. 739 was first enacted in 
1936 (see Finance Act 1936 s. 18,). The intention was to 
discourage wealthy resident British subjects from transferring 
their UK assets to offshore companies or trusts abroad and being 
able to continue to enjoy the benefit of these assets without UK 
tax liability.
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The Inland Revenue argued that the section was, as a matter 
of construction, intended to apply to transfers made by 
individuals at a time when they were not resident in the UK. The 
Special Commissioner, three Court of Appeal judges and five 
House of Lords judges were, however, unanimous in saying that 
the section, as a matter of construction, did not extend to a 
transfer made at a time when the transferor was non-resident. 
The House of Lords pointed out that in the Hansard report of 
the debate in the House of Commons in 1936 it was made clear 
by the Financial Secretary to the Treasury that the section only 
applied to transfers made by residents. Although never 
mentioned in the court proceedings, the briefing notes prepared 
by the Board of Inland Revenue for use by ministers in both the 
House of Commons and the House of Lords debates in 1936 
made it clear beyond doubt that it was never the Inland 
Revenue's intention to apply this legislation to transfers made by 
non-residents. For example, on p. 5 of the board's guidance 
notes for use by ministers in the House of Lords, the Board of 
Inland Revenue stated:
'It should be noted in particular that the charge under this clause 
applies only to indinduals who are ordinary residents in this country 
and in respect of transfers of assets which they made while ordinarily 
resident in this country.'
The position is further confirmed in correspondence between 
the Board of Inland Revenue and the Treasury in 1938. It 
follows, therefore, that both Parliament and the Inland Revenue 
never intended the legislation to be applied to transfers made by 
non-residents. Nevertheless, some time in the late 1950s or 
early 1960s, the Inland Revenue evidently decided to give the 
legislation a wider construction in direct contradiction to its 
own policy, as explained to ministers, and the intention of 
Parliament, without first going back to Parliament to get the law 
changed. It therefore appears that tax has been collected for 
between thirty and forty years under either a deliberate or an 
extremely careless misinterpretation of the legislation. This 
could result in a large number of claims against the Inlando o
Revenue for repayment of tax, with repayment supplements 
(tax-free interest), that has been wrongly assessed, under the 
principle of equitable restitution. This may have wider general 
importance going beyond the issue of personal portfolio bonds. 
There is recent House of Lords authority tor this in Woolwich 
Equitable Building Society v Commissioners of Inland Revenue [1989] 
AC 70. Reference should also be made to David Securities Pty Ltd 
v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1992] 24 ATR 125 where the 
High Court of Australia decided that payments made under a 
mistake of law should prima facie be recoverable.
Finance Act 1997
In November 1996, it was announced that s. 739 was to be 
amended so that it could apply to a transfer made at a time when 
the transferor is non-resident (Finance Act 1997 s. 81,). Section 
739 was also amended to make it clear that it can apply where 
there is an intention to avoid a tax other than income tax, for 
example inheritance tax. Many advisers have misunderstood this 
second amendment and have, for example, stated that the 
section can apply in cases where there is no tax-avoidance 
purpose. That is not correct. If there is no tax-avoidance 
purpose in relation to any tax s. 739 cannot apply, whether in its 
old form or its new form because the s. 741 (a) and (b) 
defences, which are explained below, will apply. The Board of 
Inland Revenue is perfectly entitled to invite Parliament to
change the law but surely it should have admitted that it had, in 
the past, interpreted the legislation against Parliament's 
intention and not merely imply, as it did in the press release 
'REV 17' issued on 26 November 1996 that s. 739 has not been 
achieving its intended effect. Also it should not have asked 




It is quite legitimate to attack schemes which go further than what 
was intended by Parliament, but the Inland Revenue was guilty of a 
gross error of judgment in launching a general attack on all personal 
portfolio bond holders, an error of judgment in which it continues 
to persist. Many of those assessed are people of modest means, a fact 
which the Inland Revenue appears to have overlooked; indeed, it 
appears to have thought that it had discovered a seam of gold from 
which extra tax revenue could be extracted.
While the litigation in the Willoughby case is now complete, the 
background to what is now s. 739 may have been instrumental 
in persuading the Inland Revenue to refund tax wrongly assessed 
under this section and its predecessors. It may be, however, that 
repayment will have to be made to others, that is to say not 
merely to aggrieved bond holders but also to others who have 
been wrongly assessed at earlier dates in relation to quite 
different issues. In these cases the Inland Revenue might refuse» o
payment on the ground that tax paid has been assessed in 
accordance with existing practice. The Hansard report of the 
debate on the Finance Bill 1997 for 18 February 1997 reports 
Mr Jack, the Treasury Minister, as saying that the amendment 
'clearly restates the current position'. While this was strictly 
correct, Mr Jack did not explain that the 'current position' was 
based on Inland Revenue practice which was not only contrary 
to the original intention of Parliament but also contrary to the 
original intention and policy ol the Board of Inland Revenue. It 
was therefore a very wrongful practice which Mr Jack and the 
then Conservative government should not have supported by 
implication. Any claim for repayment will be based on the 
equitable remedy of restitution for unjust enrichment which has 
no statutory time limit (delay will, however, bar an equitable 
claim) and, therefore, this background will be of great 
importance in demonstrating the inequitable behaviour of the 
Inland Revenue. In fairness to the Inland Revenue, it should now 
be said that their press release issued on 18 December 1997 
concedes that in most cases involving bond holders, tax will be 
repaid. The good intentions of this press release have 
unfortunately been largely reversed by the press release (No. 38) 
issued on 17 March 1998, which contains statements which are 
incorrect, and vindictive proposals for taxation which are 
retrospective, penal and grossly unfair.
There is one further point which should be made in relation 
to the amendment made to s. 739. It is that the Inland Revenue 
proposed the change before the appeal to the House of Lords in 
the Willoughby case had even been set down for hearing, let alone 
decided! In the debate on the Finance Bill referred to above, Mr 
Jack declined to discuss the Willoughby case 'for subjudice 
reasons'. In saying this Mr Jack was entirely incorrect. A case is 
not subjudice merely because it is subject to an appeal, it is 
subjudice before the initial trial when public comment might 
influence witnesses. He was quite free, therefore, to comment 
both inside and outside the House of Commons.
The second issue: the relevance of Parliament's original 
intention
It was established in the case of Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593 
that where legislation is ambiguous it is permissible to consult 
the official Hansard report of a debate to discover the intention 
of Parliament. In the Willoughby case the Special Commissioner, 
having decided that s. 739 did not apply to a transfer made when 
a transferor was non-resident, went on to say that if he had any 
lingering doubts these were resolved by consulting Hansard.
In contrast the Court of Appeal thought that the words used 
by Parliament when the legislation was first enacted 'were 
superseded by acceptance by Parliament of the later decisions of 
the courts'. In the view of the Court of Appeal, this later 
acceptance was implied because the income tax legislation had, 
since 1936, been consolidated twice and considered in relation 
to an amendment to s. 739 which wras not relevant to the facts 
of the Willoughby case. This, their Lordships thought, had given 
Parliament opportunities to amend the section if it was felt that 
the courts had interpreted it incorrectly. The Court of Appeal 
therefore created a fiction which, with great respect, is 
somewhat artificial.
If the approach of the Court of Appeal is correct the scope for 
use of Pepper v Hart is severely restricted. The UK has regular 
consolidations and if ambiguous and uncertain areas in existing 
legislation are not reviewed by Parliament and amended when 
tax legislation is consolidated, the possibility of resorting to what 
was said when the provision was originally enacted is apparently 
barred.
There are a number of fundamental objections to the 
approach taken by the Court of Appeal in declining to have 
regard to the 1936 statements in Parliament:
(1) There is no basis on which Morritt LJ, who delivered the 
unanimous judgment, could properly have concluded that 
Parliament had at any time after 1936 made any assumption 
as to the position on the point at issue. Nothing has been 
said by Parliament on the point. The 1969 amendments 
related to an entirely different issue and the 1952 and 1970 
acts were consolidations. Moreover, by amending s. 739 of 
the Finance Act 1997, Parliament has indicated that it had not 
until then changed its mind as to whether the legislation 
should be extended to transfers made by non-residents.
(2) Morritt LJ seems to have concluded that Parliament had one 
intention in 1936 and that that intention changed in 1952, 
or in 1969 or in 1970. Not only is that incorrect, but any 
change would have been irrelevant. Statutory interpretation 
requires the seeking of the intention of Parliament in using 
particular words. The time at which such words are used and 
the time when Parliament's intention is formed is the time 
when the legislation was originally enacted. There can be no 
basis for seeking to interpret legislation on the basis of 
unvoiced assumptions which it is assumed may have been 
implicit in the mind of Parliament at a later time.
(3) Assuming the approach of Morritt LJ is correct, it is now 
necessary to approach questions of statutory interpretation, 
as in any case where legislation is ambiguous, obscure or 
leads to absurdity, by reference not merely to statements 
made in Parliament when the legislation was first enacted. It 
would also be necessary to see what cases have been decided 
which contradict those statements and then to look to see 
whether there were later occasions when Parliament had 
considered the section and seen what statements, il any, had 
been made. It would also be necessary to consider what 
unvoiced assumptions might be inferred.
(4) Since the decision in Pepper v Hart, there has been a House of 
Lords decision where statements in Parliament have been 
referred to, even though there had been subsequent 
litigation which reached a decision contrary to the 
statements. In Stubbings v Webb [1993] AC 498 the legislation 
in issue had been originally enacted in 1954. Statements 
were made in Parliament at that time that the intention was 
to enact the recommendations of the Tucker Committee on 
the reform of the law of limitations. In Letang v Cooper [1965] 
1 QB 232 Lord Denning indicated that he was not prepared 
to assume that Parliament had intended to give 
effect to the Committee's recommendations. 
Parliament enacted further legislation in 1963 and 
1975 and consolidated the legislation in 1980. 
I Parliament had the opportunity to amend the law 
alter Letang v Cooper but re-enacted the legislation 
using the same wording. Nevertheless, in 1993 the 
House of Lords gave effect to the original intention 
of Parliament. Lord Griffiths stated that he did not think it 
right to assume that the enactment of the 1963, 1975 and 
the 1980 Limitation Acts were intended to endorse Letang v 
Cooper. The same can be said with regard to the 1969 
amendments to what is now s. 739.
The third issue: transfers of foreign assets
The finding of the special commissioner was that s. 739 could 
be construed to extend to transfers of foreign assets. In the 
author's view this is technically correct, although it seems 
unlikely that this was the original intention of Parliament in 
1936. The mischief that Parliament was trying to stop was the 
transfer out of the UK of UK assets. However this was not clear 
one way or the other from the Hansard report. This issue was not 
taken on appeal from the Special Commissioner.
The fourth issue: income within specific rules providing 
relief
Probably the most important issue to have arisen in the 
Willoughby case is whether s. 739 can apply to income which is 
subject to a specific code of tax-relieving rules, as is the case with 
insurance bonds. The problem is how should a widely drawn 
anti-avoidance provision be construed when there is an apparent 
clash with other provisions in the tax code which provide for 
tax-relief of various kinds. This difficulty has occurred on many 
occasions in Australia in relation to their general anti-avoidance 
provisions. The Australian legislation now provides tor the 
legitimate use of tax relieving provisions provided that they are 
not used in connection with a tax-avoidance scheme. In the 
Willoughby case the problem for the courts was the relationship 
between a sweeping anti-avoidance provision, s. 739, and the 
tax-relieving provisions, s. 539 554.
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In the Court of Appeal, Morritt LJ said:
7 do not see why the choice of an offshore bond or policy, for the 
taxation of which Parliament has made express and recent provision, 
should be regarded as tax-avoidance at all. The tax is not avoided, it is 
deferred. Moreover it is deferred to an event which Parliament has 
prescribed not to a time of the taxpayer's choice ... The genuine 
application of the taxpayer's money in the acquisition of a species of 
property for which Parliament has determined a special regime does not 
amount to tax-avoidance merely on the ground that the taxpayer might 
have chosen a different application which would have subjected him to 
less favourable tax treatment.'
This view was echoed in the House of Lords by Lord Nolan 
when he said:
'But it would be absurd in the context of s. 741 to describe as tax- 
avoidance the acceptance of an offer of freedom from tax which 
Parliament has deliberately made. Tax-avoidance within the meaning of 
s. 741 is a course of action designed to conflict with or defeat the 
evident intention of Parliament.'
The approach adopted by both the Court of Appeal and the 
House of Lords is similar to the 'choice principle' developed in 
Australia and will be of particular relevance if the UK 
Government decides to enact a general anti-avoidance provision.
The fifth issue: double taxation
Does an assessment under s. 739 result in double taxation 
when gains are assessed under s. 539 554? This issue was raised 
before the Special Commissioner but not before the Court of 
Appeal or the House of Lords. The Special Commissioner 
decided that the two charging provisions overlapped and 
therefore do result in double taxation. The Inland Revenue 
indicated that it would in practice grant relief but when asked 
how it would calculate it was unable to provide a satisfactory 
answer. There is no statutory authority for granting relief and 
since the onus of proof was on the taxpayers, and they were 
unable to discharge it, they would have been liable to double 
taxation if s. 739 had applied. It may be that the Special 
Commissioner thought that this matter would be considered 
further on appeal. It was, however, decided not to cross-appeal 
on this issue but to concentrate on the main issues relating to 
s. 739 and 741.
The sixth issue: deferment of tax
Does deferment of liability constitute tax-avoidance for the 
purposes of s. 739? The answer is that deferment can be tax- 
avoidance but in the context of s. 739 this turns on whether the 
s. 741 defences are available. If deferment of tax liability has 
been expressly allowed by Parliament then it will not normally 
involve tax-avoidance provided that the taxpayer has not gone 
further than what is permitted by Parliament such as using a 
relief allowed by legislation as part of a wider scheme designed 
to avoid tax.
The sevenths issue: avoidance not the purpose
Section 741 states that s. 739 will not apply if:
'(a) ... the purpose of avoiding liability to taxation was not the 
purpose, or one of the purposes for which the transfer or associated 
operations or any of them were effected'; or
'(b) ... the transfer and any associated operations were bonafide 
commercial transactions and were not designed for the purpose of 
avoiding liability to taxation.'
The Willoughby case concerned one insurance bond which was 
taken out when the taxpayers were non-resident and two bonds 
taken out on the maturity of three qualifying 10+ policies after 
the taxpayers had become resident in the UK. The s. 741 
defences were, therefore, important in the case of the bonds 
taken out during the time when the taxpayers were resident in 
the UK and also in relation to the earlier bond if the argument 
that s. 739 did not apply had not succeeded.
The Special Commissioner p 
found as a fact that both the s. 
741 defences applied. The 
Court of Appeal and the House 
of Lords both agreed that the s. 
741 (a) defence applied but did 
not find it necessary to rule on 
the s. 741(b) defence. At all 
three levels of appeal it was 
stressed that what was involved 
was bona fide tax mitigation in 
connection with a genuine 
long-term retirement saving 
arrangement for which a 
substantial premium had been 
paid, in respect of which costs 
were incurred and which had to 
be continued for eight years if 
penalties were not to be suffered. As the retirement arrangement 
was in accordance with a tax-relieving code recently enacted by 
Parliament, the purpose was not one of avoiding taxation and the 
s. 741 (a) defence applied. Although the Court of Appeal did not 
make any finding in relation to s. 741(b) the matter was 
considered in argument. The Inland Revenue argued that for the 
para, (b) defence to apply, both parties had to be engaged in a 
commercial transaction. Glidewell LJ identified the weakness of 
this when he asked whether the purchase of a pound of butter 
was not a commercial transaction because the purchaser was not 
in the business of purchasing butter. The learned Lord Justice 
then asked that if he entered into a contract to insure his life, 
that was not a commercial transaction because he was not in the 
business of insuring his life. Counsel for the Inland Revenue 
seemed to agree that the payment of a premium to acquire a life 
insurance bond was a commercial transaction for the purposes 
ofs. 741(b).
While this issue was not pursued it appears that if the Inland 
Revenue's argument that the transaction must be commercial for 
both parties is correct, the s. 741 (b) defence could rarely, if ever 
apply, because assessments under s. 739 and 740 are on 
individuals in their private capacities.
On the question of \vhether a personal portfolio bond, as 
contrasted with a managed portfolio bond, involved tax- 
avoidance the Inland Revenue argued that the discretion given to 
the bond holder to select investments constituted tax-avoidance 
because the effect was the equivalent of a direct holding of a 
portfolio of investments. This argument was firmly rejected by 
Lord Hoffman in the House of Lords who pointed out that the 
investments were not owned by the bond holder but by the 
insurance company. It followed that there was no contractual 
right enabling a bond holder to claim specific investments, for 
example in a liquidation, but only to a sum equal to the value of 
the investments held. The Inland Revenue, however, remains
obsessed with the view that a personalised bond involves tax 
avoidance as the 1998 Budget proposals make clear. The Inland 
Revenue agree that a managed portfolio bond which holds 
managed funds is not tax-avoidance. Why. one may ask, should ao J' J
bond holding listed shares rather than managed funds involve 
tax-avoidance? What is involved is a bond with greater 
investment flexibility as was accepted at every level of appeal. 
Such an obstinate and irrational attitude on the part of the 
Inland Revenue is deeply worrying. Indeed, in the notes on 
clauses in the 1998 Finance Bill, this point is referred to in these 
terms: 'The House of Lords found against the Inland Revenue on 
this narrow point.' Lord Nolan, however, said that: 'This fallacy 
goes to the heart of the commissioners' case.' He went on to say:
'Like the special commissioner and the Court of Appeal, I am unable 
to follow the reasoning of the commissioners. The personal portfolio 
bond holder may fair better or worse in terms of benefits by reason of his 
control over investment policy than does his fellow bond holder with the 
standard type of bond, but the difference between them seems to me to 
have nothing to do with tax or with tax avoidance. I can see no reason 
why Parliament should have intended to distinguish between them in 
fiscal terms.' ([1997] 1 WLR 1080 F-G)
Before leaving the s. 741 defences it is important to point out 
that in practice they are not the safeguards that at first sight they 
appear to be. As has already been explained, s. 739 and 740 
provide for the assessment of individuals and therefore s. 741 
provides defences for individuals. In practice relatively few 
individuals will have the means to pursue an appeal against a 
s. 739 or 740 assessment all the way to the House of Lords with 
the result that the s. 741 defences become of academic 
importance unless the taxpayer is wealthy or backed by a third 
party, such as an insurance company, which is prepared to 
underwrite the costs incurred by the taxpayer as well as the costs 
of the Inland Revenue should they win and obtain an order for 
costs. It follows that where the amount of tax at stake is relatively 
little when compared with the potential liability for legal costs, 
taxpayers are likely to cut their losses and pay the tax without a 
formal protest. This is all the more likely when the Inland 
Revenue makes it clear at the outset that it is prepared to take 
the matter to the House of Lords if necessary.
In this context it is relevant that in an article published in the 
Times, 6 October 1990, the principal of the Inland Revenue's 
special investigation section, Mr Maurice Perry, is quoted as 
confirming that 'in the event of the special commissioners 
finding in favour of an investor, he would regard it as 'certain thato ' o
the Inland Revenue would wish to take the matter to the High 






In other words, the Inland Revenue was quite happy to use its 
immense resources to discourage challenges from taxpayers, 
without qualification, in the belief that the Inland Revenue was 
wholly right in the view it then held and, apparently, still holds! 
This high-handed approach may have infringed the European 
Convention on Human Rights as tantamount to denying a right
of appeal to the courts. Certainly there were bona fide investors 
in retirement bonds who paid tax assessed on them, in all 
probability because they were intimidated by the approach 
adopted by the Inland Revenue. A more acceptable approach 
would have been to say that depending on the reasons given by 
the special commisioners and any special facts, the Inland 
Revenue would decide whether to appeal further.
Finally it should be stressed that both the Court of Appeal and 
the House of Lords held that the s. 741 (a) defence applied to 
investments in personal portfolio bonds for genuine long-term 
saving purposes by residents as well as by non-residents.
The eighth issue: treaty exemption
The question of whether income which arises in a bond in an 
Isle of Man insurance company is exempt by virtue of the double 
taxation treaty with the UK was the subject of a highly technical 
argument which was resolved in favour of the Inland Revenue.
In the course of cross-examination before the Special 
Commissioner, counsel for the Inland Revenue raised the fact 
that the taxpayers had moved to Alderney in May 1992 and that 
therefore they were avoiding liability to UK taxation under both 
s. 739 and s. 539 554, the chargeable events regime. This issue 
has been referred to in recent articles and is also mentioned in 
press release No. 38 of 17 March 1998. It is therefore 
appropriate to deal with it even though it has no relevance to any 
of the findings in the case.
ABUSE OF POWER
The Inland Revenue has not merely misconstrued the legislation. It 
has deliberately misrepresented the intention of the legislation and 
attempted to apply it contrary to its own advice to ministers and 
through them to Parliament. It would be difficult to find a stronger 
case for the intervention of equity or, if necessary, the European 
Court of Human Rights, to ensure restitution.
As the Special Commissioner held, the move to Alderney was 
'a change of plan' for which a number of reasons were given in 
evidence. These included connections with the Island going back 
to 1970, the presence of many friends of the taxpayers in 
Alderney, the quality of life (especially the absence of serious 
crime and pollution), the limited number of motor vehicles, the 
existence of village shops not under threat from supermarkets, 
the proximity of France and the scope for the taxpayers to 
indulge their hobby of sailing. UK taxation played no part in 
their decision; indeed as was pointed out in evidence, the 
taxpayers' bonds became caught by s. 67, Income Tax (Guernsey) 
Law 1975 which is a general anti-avoidance 
provision far wider in scope than s. 739.
While often described pejoratively as a tax 
haven, Alderney's equivalent of stamp duty (a tax 
on wealth) is 5.5% and, while income tax is levied 
at 20%, after adding social security contributions 
and separate contributions to the Guernsey health 
scheme, the real rate of 'income tax' is much more 
than 20%. But to return to what the Special Commissioner 
called 'a change of plan', the move to Alderney was also 
accompanied by one of the taxpayers returning to work in Hong 
Kong, thus giving rise to further tax liability in another 
jurisdiction. For the record the author now pays taxes regularly 
in five jurisdictions.
It is, nevertheless, correct that the taxpayers are no longer at 
risk to UK income tax under s. 539 554. It is not correct, as 
appears to have been suggested, that they disposed of their bonds 
after moving to Alderney. Had this been done a substantial 
liability to Guernsey income tax would have arisen. In point of 
fact they have retained their bonds for use as a pension fund 
from which withdrawals will be made when the time comes for 
retirement. It should be added that the UK Inland Revenue has 
no ground whatever for complaint that the bonds have left their 
jurisdiction. The savings involved were saved out of Hong Kong 
taxed income without any relief from UK taxation. There is 
therefore no reason whatever why the UK Inland Revenue 
should have any interest in the fact that the chargeable events 
legislation (s. 539 554) is no longer relevant.
PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES
The Willoughby case raises a number of public policy issues. 
There are many former expatriates who invested retirement 
savings in life insurance bonds in good faith and merely 
attempted to provide for taxable retirement income in a 
responsible way comparable with the arrangements available for 
UK residents. Nevertheless, there are a number of expatriates 
who were advised to transfer their bonds into trust as part of 
wider schemes to avoid income and inheritance tax and 
therefore have probably been engaged in tax planning. It is quite 
legitimate to attack schemes which go further than what waso o
intended by Parliament, but the Inland Revenue was guilty of a 
gross error of judgment in launching a general attack on all 
personal portfolio bond holders, an error of judgment in which 
it continues to persist. Many of those assessed are people of 
modest means, a fact which the Inland Revenue appears to have 
overlooked; indeed, it appears to have thought that it had 
discovered a seam of gold from which extra tax revenue could be 
extracted.
THE 1998 BUDGET
It is clear from the Inland Revenue's Press Release No. 38 
issued on 17 March 1998 following the 1998 Budget Speech, 
that the Inland Revenue remains obsessed with the use of 
personal portfolio bonds which the press release states 'are 
designed primarily for tax-avoidance purposes'. While it is 
correct that there are taxpayers who have used these bonds for 
tax-avoidance purposes, it is equally correct that there are many 
others who, like the Willoughbys, were merely looking for an 
ultimately taxable 'pension'. The reason for using a personalised 
bond was to obtain greater investment flexibility so as to, for 
example, include a shareholding in a particular listed company in 
addition to unit trusts and other approved funds. The apparent 
rejection of the unanimous decisions of the Special 
Commissioner, the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords that 
personal portfolio bonds in themselves do not involve tax- 
avoidance is disturbing. It appears that the Inland Revenue does 
not regard the rule of law as applying to it and that the decisions 
of the highest court in the land can be ignored without giving any 
reason.
DISCHARGE OF ASSESSMENTS AND 
REPAYMENT OF TAX
Should, as is only right and proper, the Inland Revenue be 
required to discharge assessments wrongly made under s. 739 
and to repay tax with a repayment supplement in some instances
to those who were engaged in tax-avoidance, it has only itself too o J
blame. These proceedings were misconceived from the outset 
and, in my opinion, biased though it may be, they have shown 
the Inland Revenue to have been guilty not merely of serious 
misjudgment but also of an oppressive abuse of power.
With regard to the question of repayment of tax that has been 
wrongly assessed a number of matters are relevant. The first is 
the general point that the Inland Revenue, in misapplying s. 739, 
contrary to the intention of Parliament and its own policy, 
should not be permitted to rely on the excuse that it was acting 
in accordance with an existing practice.
The principle of equitable restitution for unjust enrichment 
should surely not be ousted by such a wrongful 'existing 
practice'. The equitable principle was applied by the House of 
Lords in Woolwich Equitable Building Society v Commissioners of Inland 
Revenue [1989] AC 70 where tax had been collected under 
invalid legislation. However, Lord Goff, who delivered the 
leading judgment, observed that:
'This principle [of equitable restitution] should extend to embrace 
cases in which the tax or other levy has been wrongly exacted ... because 
the authority has misconstrued a relevant statute or regulation.'
It should be appreciated that as an equitable rather than a 
statutory remedy there is no express time limit. Delay in 
bringing proceedings for recovery if excessive will prevent a 
court of equity from allowing restitution.
NO TAXATION WITHOUT 
MISREPRESENTATION
In this instance, however, the Inland Revenue has not merely 
misconstrued the legislation. It has deliberately misrepresented 
the intention of the legislation and attempted to apply it contrary 
to its own advice to ministers and through them to Parliament. 
It would be difficult to find a stronger case for the intervention 
of equity or, if necessary, the European Court of Human Rights, 
to ensure restitution. In the light of the press release issued on 
18 December 1997 this seems to have been accepted. The press 
release set out the details of tax repayment to bond holders.
ANALYSIS OF CATEGORIES OF BOND 
HOLDERS
The next matter involves an analysis of the different categories 
of retirement bond holders. For a start, one can leave out 
managed portfolio bonds because the Inland Revenue has stated 
all along that it was not concerned with them in the context of
O
s. 739, although if they have been used as part of a wider tax- 
avoidance plan, s. 739 will probably apply and the s. 741 escape 
clauses will not be available. Where bonds have been held in 
trust the Budget proposals when enacted will nullify any tax 
advantage obtained. With regard to holders of personal portfolio 
bonds there are, perhaps, four categories of bonds to consider:
(1) Bonds which have been taken out for genuine long term 
retirement planning which did not involve tax avoidance and 
in respect of which assessments have been made but no tax 
has been paid. These are outside s. 739 in both its old and 
amended form. In these cases the assessments should be 
discharged;
(2) Bonds which are in the same category as (1) above except 
that tax has been assessed and paid. In these cases the 
assessment should be discharged and the tax repaid with a 
repayment supplement. It is understood that the Inland
Revenue has been repaying tax, with a repayment 
supplement, to those bond holders who appealed against 
assessments or who paid under protest. It may be that 
repayment has not been made in all cases to those who had 
paid tax without protest. These bond holders are, perhaps, 
in the greatest need of consideration because they were not 
properly advised. It would have been very unfair to exclude 
them from repayment and it is now understood that 
repayments have been made in many, if not all, these cases;
(3) Bonds within the same category as (2) above except that 
bond holders have surrendered their policies. In these cases 
the assessments should be discharged, the tax repaid with a 
repayment supplement, and compensation should be paid 
for loss of retirement planning arrangements. It is not 
known what has happened in these cases; and
(4) Bonds taken out in part to avoid inheritance tax at a time 
when the bond holder was non-resident. In these cases 
assessments made before 26 November 1996 should be 
discharged and any tax paid repaid with a repayment 
supplement. In these cases, however, there will often have 
been a tax-avoidance purpose but even though the s. 741 
defences may not apply, neither can s. 739 in respect of 
pre-26 November 1996 income and gains. Assessments 
under s. 739 in its old form will therefore be ultra vires. 
However, the Furniss v Dawson doctrine might apply to 
pre-26 November 1996 bond income and gains, as might 
the doctrine of a disposition by associated operations where 
an attempt has been made to avoid inheritance tax.
It is now clear that the Inland Revenue has conceded that it 
has acted wrongly because its Press Release for 18 December 
1997 admits that many taxpayers 'have already experienced a 
long period of uncertainty over their tax position' and states that:
'In the interest of resolving outstanding issues as quickly as possible, 
the Inland Revenue has decided, with the approval of Ministers, that, in 
the exceptional circumstances of this matter, including the particular 
handling in the past of individual cases it will repay tax with repayment 
supplements in most cases and apply the chargeable events legislation as 
appropriate, i.e. the 1984 special regimeJor taxing insurance bonds.'
Had the matter been left there all would have been fine. Those 
who had used personal portfolio bonds for genuine retirement 
purposes would be in the clear and those who had engaged in 
wider tax avoidance by using trusts and relying on the drafting 
error which resulted in the so-called dead settlor schemes would 
be caught by the amended s. 739, the Furniss v Dawson principle 
and the 'associated operations' doctrine in the case of 
inheritance tax. Regrettably, and unnecessarily, the Inland 
Revenue seems to have persuaded the government, effectively 
and retrospectively, to impose a deemed tax penalty on all 
personal portfolio bonds with effect from 6 April 1999. The 
intention is also to amend the chargeable events regime to nullifyo o J
the use of trusts to shelter bonds from income tax. The author 
has no quarrel with the latter as the dead settlor schemes almost 
certainly did involve tax-avoidance. What is objectionable is the 
continued insistence that personal portfolio bonds were 
primarily used for tax-avoidance purposes when the House of 
Lords has said that this view is not merely wrong but 'absurd'. At 
the time of writing the Finance Bill has not been published and 
it may be that bonds that have not in fact been 'personalised' by 
the holding of personal investments, as opposed to managed 
funds, will not be penalised even though power exists to hold 
personalised assets.
ABUSE OF POWER: THE LESSONS
In addition to misrepresenting legislation as having an 
intention opposite to that originally intended and referring to 
unpublished and confidential decisions of the special 
commisioners in correspondence with the taxpayer, the Inland 
Revenue has also broken one of the cardinal rules applicable to 
revenue authorities, namely over-zealously putting at risk one of 
its strongest anti-avoidance weapons. It is a matter of further 
regret that Treasury Ministers in John Major's Conservative 
government were apparently prepared to support the Inland 
Revenue's approach without applying the necessary checks and 
balances on which British constitutional law depends. It now 
appears that in this regard Tony Blair's administration is no 
better. This background is of particular relevance if the UK is to 
have a general anti-avoidance provision. It is clear that safeguards 
will be needed to prevent abuse of such a power by the Inland 
Revenue particularly in relation to individual taxpayers of 
modest means. A partial solution \vould be to shift the burden of 
proof from the taxpayer to the Inland Revenue. This would give 
the taxpayer the benefit of the doubt in any borderline case. The 
Inland Revenue would also be wise not to use a general anti-o
avoidance provision too frequently because once cases start to be 
lost, the provision will lose its deterrent effect. The experience 
in Australia with its s. 260, the general anti-avoidance section 
which preceded pt. IV(A) of the Australian Income Tax Assessment 
Act, has demonstrated this all too clearly.
WIDER POLICY ISSUES
On a more general matter, the government should consider 
whether expatriates are to be encouraged to save for retirement 
before their eventual return to the UK in a prudent tax-efficient 
way comparable with that available for residents. Were the 
government to take a fresh look at this matter, ignoring theo ' o o
paranoia and the tunnel vision of the Inland Revenue, the 
retirement savings of many expatriates could be invested onshore 
to the benefit of the UK economy rather than offshore in other 
jurisdictions. It is the mishandling of the personal portfolio 
bonds saga that may well have resulted in many expatriates 
deciding not to return.
FACING A JUGGERNAUT
From a personal point of view, the experience has 
demonstrated how difficult it is for a private individual to resist 
what Lord Goff has described as the 'coercive power of the 
state'. An individual who wishes to resist a wrongful assessment 
is at a huge disadvantage having regard to:
(a) limited resources in contrast with the Inland Revenue;
(b) lack of inside information (the Inland Revenue was able to 
rely on unpublished special commisioners' decisions, the 
reliance on which may have been a breach of art. 6 ol the 
European Convention on Human Rights);
(c) the assessment process, which is largely under the control of 
the Inland Revenue, and can be accelerated or delayed as it 
suits the inspector;
(d) the onus of proof which is on the taxpayer; and
(e) the requirement that the appellant must pay his own costs 
before the special commisioners and run the risk of costs in 
subsequent appeals if the Inland Revenue insists on pursuing 
the taxpayer to the House of Lords.
Contrary to the Taxpayer's Charter, the Inland Revenue has 
been slow in making assessments, replying to letters and also ino 1 J o
meeting deadlines required by the litigation process. It took six 
years and four months from the first letter written by the 
taxpayer to the Inland Revenue to achieve a decision from the 
House of Lords even though the High Court level of appeal was 
leapfrogged, at the taxpayers' request. The delay and expense of 
civil litigation has been criticised recently and is subject to 
review. It is important that any reforms take into consideration 
the plight of the individual who has to take on the deep pocket 
of the state. Perhaps those in the public service found to have 
abused their power should run the risk of some form of personal 
financial penalty.
CONCLUSION
The case raises many legal issues of importance to tax 
practitioners and to the Inland Revenue. What is also at stake, 
and what is perhaps more important, is the fair treatment of 
individuals who have acted in good faith in reliance upon the 
Inland Revenue's press release of 1983 and the subsequent 1984 
legislation when entering into retirement arrangements. These 
are, in substance, little different from retirement annuities and 
personal pensions available to UK residents except that the 
savings have been accumulated outside the UK. Unfortunately 
the use of personal portfolio bonds by aggressive, and some 
might think irresponsible, tax planners has so distorted the 
attitude of the Inland Revenue that the end result   that all 
personal portfolio bonds are to be effectively outlawed   is not 
really a surprise. The Inland Revenue's apparent rejection of the 
unanimous view of the Special Commissioner, the Court of 
Appeal and the House of Lords that personal portfolio bonds, 
used sensibly, do not involve tax-avoidance is an equally- 
discreditable over reaction.
At least the government has allowed personal portfolio bond 
holders a year in which to sort matters out. It is to be hoped that 
this can be done by converting personal portfolio bonds to 
managed portfolio bonds without the need to surrender the
former and thereby trigger a tax liability on all gains in the bond.J oo J o
Presuming this is not possible and a reasonable solution cannot 
be found for those bond holders who have not engaged in tax-o o
avoidance, it may be that disgruntled personal portfolio bond 
holders will have to get together and fight all the way to theo o o J
House of Lords yet again, once the European Convention on 
Human Rights has been formally adopted as applicable to UK 
legislation. Alternatively, it may be possible to commence 
proceedings now in the European Court of Human Rights. Who 
knows, the UK Inland Revenue may achieve the signal 
distinction of being the first UK government department to have 
some of its legislation declared contrary to the European 
Convention on Human Rights!o
During the course of the summer, the British Government 
agreed that existing bonds which had not been taken for tax 
avoidance purpose would not be penalised under the 1998 
regulations. The draft regulations were issued in July, with a 
consultation period lasting until 11 September. The final form is 
not expected until the end of October. The concerns of the 
author expressed regarding retirement savings bonds have been
TOO O
met. It is hoped that more general concerns will be addressed by 
the Inland Revenue internally.  
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